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The Eastern bloc countries have been under communist leadership for almost fifty years. After 
the 1989 collapse of communist leadership, new regimes have been installed. The roads from 
socialism to capitalism, from totalitariasm to democracy have been extremely difficult and tested 
both the people and the leaders. The present paper takes a look at the first years of Romania’s 
democracy and its economic reforms. Although democratic elections have been organized and 
some reforms have been undertaken, compared to other states Romania might not have done 
enough. 
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Introduction 
1989 was a year of revolt in Eastern Europe. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania 
won back their freedom by eliminating their leaders peacefully, in the case of the first three or 
violently in the case of Romania, as “Nicolae Ceausescu, was the one Communist despot who 
was determined to shed blood rather than relinquish power”
211.  The most representative moment 
of the year was the dismantling of the Berlin Wall which started in November. 
All the above mentioned countries had to go through massive and painful reforms to change their 
economies, political and social life from socialism to capitalism and democracy. But the process 
was different from country to country. White
212 considers two main types of change: transition 
from  below  (the  case  of  Poland,  Romania  and  Czechoslovakia)  and  transition  from  above 
(Hungary, Bulgaria and USSR) 
In the case of Poland, the Solidarity was considered the most powerful symbol of liberty in the 
communist world
213. Its leader, Lech Walesa had a major role in 1989 and became the first 
elected president in 1990. The change of power was peaceful and based mainly on round-table 
negotiations between the leaders of the Communist Party and the leaders of Solidarity. 
In  Hungary,  the  democratic  breakthrough  between  March  and  June  1989  consisted  in  a 
considerable shift from a dichotomy between officialdom and the opposition towards a growing 
self-inclusion of party hardliners into the opposition. It continued in October, when the Comunist 
Party  Congress  decided  to  form  a  European-style  Hungarian  Socialist  Party,  committed  to 
democratic socialism and mixed economy. The elections in the spring of 1990 were won by the 
Democratic  Forum,  and  together  with  their  allies  they  formed  the  new  government,  thus 
eliminating the old communist leadership of the country. 
The change of regimes in Czechoslovakia was known as the “Velvet Revolution”, which stands 
for  the  peaceful  mass  gatherings  that  toppled  the  Czechoslovak  government  in  November 
1989.While the notions “velvet revolution” or “soft revolution” referred only to the mass protests 
in November, they soon came to signify the whole process of the demise of communism
214. The 
process of change ended in June 1990, when Vaclav Havel was elected president. 
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The political perspective 
Romania became a republic again after the communists won the 1946 elections and forced King 
Mihai I to flee the country the next year. In the case of all the Eastern Europe the original 
transition  to  socialism  did  not  arise  by  organic  development:  “the  socialist  system  does  not 
originate spontaneously from the intrinsic, internal forces of the economy. Instead, the socialist 
system is imposed on society by the communist party with brutal force, when it gains power. It 
liquidates its political opponents and breaks up any opposition. The communist party that comes 
to power has a vision of what society, economy and culture it wishes to create: a system that 
eliminates private property and the market, replacing them with state ownership and planning”
215. 
All the above mentioned characteristics could be observed in Romania’s evolution during 1946 
and 1989.  
More than forty years later, in December 1989, Romanians fought and won back their freedom. 
The repression of demonstrations for democracy in Timisoara, when the security forces, the hated 
Securitate
216, shot dead 71 on the weekend of 16–17 December
217, sparked off mass protests in 
Bucharest. Ceausescu, and his wife Elena, refused to budge and ordered the mobilization of the 
Securitate, and the army, to put down the demonstrators by whatever means necessary. 
The army hesitated, as did a section of the Securitate. In face of continuing intransigence, and 
growing popular opposition (Ceausescu was heckled by the protesters in Bucharest when he 
appealed to them to go home on 21 December), long hidden opponents within the Party, headed 
by Ion Iliescu, army officers and even some Securitate leaders, organized to overthrow him. 
Arrested as they tried to flee the country, Ceausescu and his wife were executed on Christmas 
Day, an execution seen on television by a global audience  
The exact nature of the events of December 1989 in Romania has long been the subject of intense 
speculation, it is still unclear whether the events constituted a revolution or some other form of 
irregular political challenge such as a coup d’état or popular uprising. The overall conclusion is 
that although a revolutionary situation arose in the country in 1989, a revolutionary outcome is 
not yet assured
218. There are critics that argue that Ion Iliescu and NSF took advantage of the 
chaos in order to stage a coup. It is still not clear if it was thought in advance or whether it was a 
pragmatic action of an elite group who took advantage of the situation. What is without doubt is 
that because of his ruthless politics, Ceausescu was abandoned by numerous officials of the 
Government, the Party, the Army and his secret police
219. 
After the events on December 1989, Romania became a democracy again and it organized its first 
free elections in May 1990. The big winners of the elections were, as expected the National 
Salvation Front and its leader Ion Iliescu. The National Salvation Front was a coalition of former 
communists which took over the functions of the government after the overthrow of Ceausescu in 
December. It later split into the Social Democrat Party, led by Iliescu and the Democratic Party, 
led by Petre Roman, and later by Traian Basescu. 
Ion Iliescu was a former member of the Politburo – considered by many the future leader of 
Romania, after the death of Ceausescu. Iliescu did not have the “revolutionary’s aura” of Havel 
or Walesa, but he still won the 1990, 1992 and 2000 elections. 
Unfortunately, 1990 was a year marked by violence as coal miners “visited” Bucharest to stop 
anti-communist demonstrations organized by the political and social opposition of NSF. One of 
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the greatest discontents of the demonstrators was the implication of the second level activists of 
the Communist Party in the new structures of Power
220.  
The new Government, led by Petre Roman wanted fast reforms and established new relations 
with  the  EU  and  USA.  Roman’s  failure  to  explain  adequately  both  the  purposes  and  the 
consequences of genuine liberalization and stabilization fueled the resentment of precisely those 
constituencies to whom the NSF owed its May 1990 electoral victory. So, in 1991 Petre Roman 
was replaced with Stolojan, the finance minister. 
The 1992 elections were won again by Iliescu who made an alliance with the nationalist parties 
and  the  party  of  the  former  communists.  Although  the  composition  of  the  Parliament  and 
government changed, the domination of Iliescu and the presidency continued
221. Vacaroiu was 
named prime-minster and the goal of the new Government was to “slow down market reforms 
that  might  favor  foreign  business  interests”
222.  The  1992-1996  period  was  marked  by 
privatization  scandals  and  frauds  made  by  the  people  in  power,  determining  the  halting  of 
progress and reforms needed at that time. 
 
Economic perspective  
There is a debate regarding Romania’s economic situation. Some argue that as Romania entered 
the 90s, the country was in many ways in a better position to pursue economic restructuring than 
other East European countries. In December 1989, Romania had almost no foreign debt and 
maintained a current account surplus of $2.8 billion and foreign exchange reserves of $ 1.7 
billion. Other economic indicators (current account balance, debt-to-GDP ratio and hard currency 
holdings) were better than any other East European country
223. Others consider that Romania 
started its transition to a market economy at a serious disadvantage, with significantly worse 
initial conditions than those prevailing in the leading reform countries. Romanian policy makers 
have  had  less  room  to  maneuver  in  taking  the  painful  political  steps  necessary  to  liberalize 
Romania’s  formerly  Stalinist  economic  system.  Apart  from  the  reduced  level  of  investment, 
growth  possibilities  were  also  impaired  by  a  sharp  reduction  in  imports  of  machinery  and 
equipment from the West. The heavy overtaxation of domestic consumption, which took place 
during this period in order to meet external debt obligations, resulted in lower growth rates of 
production, reduced welfare (consumption), and bigger domestic imbalances , both visible and 
hidden
224. 
Privatization moved slowly in the first years although the legal framework was set up to sell of 
55% of state equity. The state maintained its control in strategic areas as energy, transport and 
telecommunications. In selling equity 30% was to be allocated to Romanian citizens, leaving the 
rest for foreign and domestic investors. The allocation to the citizens was done through vouchers, 
but the system proved its limitations because of inflation, speculation and public apathy. 
In 1992, industry was still 90% controlled by the state and registered a continuous fall to score a 
cumulative decline of 54% over 1989
225. 
The macroeconomic data for 1993 and 1994 would seem to suggest an unanticipated level of 
success for Vacaroiu’s policies. The decline in GDP was reversed (with 1.5 and 3.9 percent 
gains, respectively), and industrial production increased (with increases of 1.3 and 3.3 percent, 
and with overall industrial productivity jumping to 9 and 14.7 percent, respectively)
226. However, 
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due to high inflation and further price liberalizations, real wages fell by 16.7 percent in 1993 
(with a marginal 0.4 percent recovery in 1994). 
Table 1. 
Selected economic indicators of Romania’s economy (1990 - 1997) 
 
Indicator  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98 
Unemployment (%)  1  3  8.2  10,4  10,9  9,5  6,6  8,9  10,4 
Inflation (%)  5,1  170  210  256  136  32  38  154  59 
GDP (%)  -5,6  -12,9  -13,6  1,3  3,9  7,1  4  -6,6  -7,3 
Foreign debt (billion. $)  1,14  2,13  3,24  4,24  5,51  6,64  8,3  9,5  9,8 
Source:  http://www.indexmundi.com/romania/gdp_real_growth_rate.html,  https://statistici.insse.ro/ipc/,  http://www 
.insse.ro /cms/files/pdf/ro/cap3.pdf 
 
Moreover,  the  Vacaroiu  government’s  decision  to  continue  subsidies  to  state  enterprises 
increased the budget deficit to 4.4 percent of GDP in 1994; and despite the National Bank’s 
reluctance, the money supply was increased by 500 percent during these two years, resulting in 
inflation of 256 and 136 percent respectively, for 1993 and 1994 (Table 1.). 
Critics  asserted  that  while  temporary  improvement  in  some  areas  had  been  reported,  it  was 
largely  at  the  expense  of,  rather  than  due  to,  genuine  economic  reforms  The  World  Bank’s 
comparative analyses of transitional economies (1995) found Romanian liberalization and private 
sector  development  near  the  bottom  of  Group  2  (which,  in  addition  to  Romania,  included 
Bulgaria, Albania, the Baltic countries, and Mongolia). 
Bacon is trying to find out why did the macroeconomic data reflect so dramatic a recovery? His 
considers the data on the state budget’s deficit as a proportion of GDP are enlightening. While 
the deficit was 2.6 percent of GDP in 1993, the transitional year, it had risen to 4.2 percent in 
1994.  Despite  the  attempts  by  the  National  Bank  to  institute  a  tight  monetary  policy,  the 
government,  out  of  the  political  need  of  their  voters,  continued  to  pursue  a  policy  of  “soft 
credit”—heavily subsidizing indebted and inefficient state economic units, directing the state’s 
fledgling commercial banks to provide negative (1993) and low-interest (1994) loans to loss-
making enterprises and state farms
227. 
In 1994, the private sector accounted for only 35 per cent of the economy, a low figure when 
compared with 55 per cent in Hungary and Poland and 65 per cent in the Czech Republic. 
1995 was an even more favorable year. GDP grew 7.1 percent, and industrial output grew by 9.4 
percent,  while  inflation  fell  to  27.8  percent
228.  Real  income,  “electorally  the  most  fungible 
indicator, rose 12.5 percent”
229. However, the budget deficit remained at an unacceptably high 4.1 
percent of GDP. The expansion of the GDP, which should have enabled the economy to “grow” 
out of indebtedness, had been realized. However, genuine reform within the framework of the 
“Washington consensus” remained inconsistent
230.  
An unexpected energy crisis began in 1996, a year of discontent for Romania. After some delays, 
the government was obliged in May 1996 to raise prices for basic consumer goods, including 
energy, after a sharp devaluation of the forced its hand. The annual inflation rate, projected by the 
government to be 20 percent for the year 1996, soared to nearly 60 percent by year’s end (Table 
1.).  To  add  to  the  uncertainty,  two  Romanian  banks,  Credit  Bank  and  Dacia  Felix,  became 
illiquid  due  to  massively  nonperforming  loan  portfolios,  incompetent  management,  endemic 
cronyism, and corruption. The National Bank, already overextended by a looming increase in 
                                                       
227 Bacon, W. (2004) Economic Reform, “Romania since 1989” (ed. Henry Carey), Lexington Books, Oxford, p.377. 
228 http://www.indexmundi.com/romania/gdp_real_growth_rate.html 
229 Bacon, W. (2004) Economic Reform, “Romania since 1989” (ed. Henry Carey), Lexington Books, Oxford, p.378 
230  Cojanu,  V.  (2007)  From  Washington  Consensus  to  Lisbon  Agenda:  What  Lessons  for  Economic  Models  in 
Romania?, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 4.  
foreign  and  domestic  debt,  had  to  bail  out  the  bank




Romania’s transition has been a long and strenuous 
two significant turning points in Romania’s transition: 1) 
displaced the Ceausescu dictatorship and 2) 
parties which initiated a second phase of reform.
democracy, the elites of the old Romanian Communist Party, or 
them, were actually the beneficiaries of the revolu
have taken full advantage of the transition to the 
political  power,  and  control  of  state  resources  to 
economy, transforming, quite legally, the political
economic domination of a new oligarchy





Compared to the progress of Poland, Hungary and Cze
lagging behind. A proof of this lag is the date of 
have achieved three years faster than Romania.
Turnock considers that in Hungary privatization mov
able  to  privatize  faster  than  Romania  its  main  indu
numerous joint ventures with Austrian, German and Swiss companies
In Poland’s case, we have to take into consideratio
adopted by the new government sought to stabilize t
moving the country toward a market economy. Although initially the economy went int
                                                       
231 Crowther, W. (2010) Contemporary Romanian politics
232 Gabanyi p.353 
233 Turnock, D. (2005) The East European Economy in Context
369 
foreign  and  domestic  debt,  had  to  bail  out  the  banks,  all  the  while  trying  to  counter  the 
Romania’s transition has been a long and strenuous road. According to Crowther, there have been 
points in Romania’s transition: 1) the events in December 1989 
aced the Ceausescu dictatorship and 2) the 1996 transfer of power to the liberal oppositio
parties which initiated a second phase of reform.
231 Although the 1989 events brought change and 
the elites of the old Romanian Communist Party, or at least a sizable number of 
them, were actually the beneficiaries of the revolution. In fact, one could easily argue that they 
have taken full advantage of the transition to the “free market,” using their inside knowledge, 
political  power,  and  control  of  state  resources  to  privatize  their  power  over  the  Romanian 




Economic growth of Romania, Hungary and Poland 1990-1998 (%) 
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recession, by 1992 growth resumed. “By the end of the decade the Polish economy was one of 
the fastest growing in Europe, with an average rate of growth of 6.5 percent between 1995 and 
1997 and 4.5 percent between 1998 and 1999, and Poland was seen as the most successful of 
Central European countries that had embarked on similar political and economic transitions in 
1989”
234. 
From a political perspective, one notable difference when compared to other former communist 
states  is  the  background  of  the  post-revolutionary  leaders.  In  Poland,  Czechoslovakia  and 
Hungary the number of former communist leaders in the new governmental apparatus was rather 
low. Two decades after the December Revolution, it is still unclear if it had been a transition to 
democracy:  communist  party  figures  are  still  influential
235,  property  has  been  privatized  but 
allowed to accumulate in the hands of a small group of oligarchs, and although there were free 
elections, there had been “only a partial move to a form of limited and accountable government 
that was based on the rule of law”
236. 
We can conclude that the political will for real reforms did not exist. Most of the decisions were 
populist,  and  in  spite  of  this  regimes  changed  every  four  years.  One  excuse  could  be  the 
avoidance of popular unrest which could have led to civil war. 
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